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This  paper  examines  the  role  of  popular  participation,  in  particular 
through  NGOs,  in  both  promoting  democracy  (seen  as  essential  for  better 
governance)  and  the  maintenance  of  a  market  economy.  Making  a  crucial 
distinction  between  the  forms  and  characteristics  of  good  government,  it 
finds  no  empirical  relationship  between  the  form  of  government  and  success- 
ful  development.  It  argues  that  while  democracy  promotes  liberty  it  may  not 
promote  opulence,  while  mass  participation  through  pressure  groups  may  harm 
rather  than  aid  the  attainment  of  both  opulence  and  liberty.  Finally,  it 
examines  the  role  NGOs  should  play  in  World  Bank  operations,  and  finds  there 
is  no  presumption  one  way  or  another  that  this  is  desirable,  and  argues  that 
the  only  test  is  the  contingent  one  of  cost-effectiveness. 
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"For  forms  of  government,  let  fools  contest; 
whatever's  best  administered,  is  best." 
(Alexander  Pope:  Essay  on  Man) 
INTRODUCTION  AND  SYNOPSIS 
A  most  remarkable  movement  from  the  plan  to  the  market-both  in 
development  thinking  and  practice  --  has  characterized  the  last  two  decades. 
This  in  turn  has  opened  up  new  questions  about  the  sustainability  of  a 
market  economy,  not  least  about  the  necessary  bulwarks  against  the  unavoid- 
able  political  pressures  for  its  subversion.  An  emerging  theme  amongst  both 
practitioners  and  analysts  of  developing  countries  is  the  role  of  popular 
participation,  and  in  particular  of  non-governmental  organizations  (NGOs)  in 
both  the  promotion  of  democracy  (seen  as  essential  for  better  governance) 
and  the  maintenance  of  a  market  economy.  This  paper  seeks  to  set  the  N 
resulting  debate  in  its  historical  and  intellectual  context,  and  thereby 
provides  a  critique  of  what  may  turn  out  to  be  yet  another  development 
fad.  1  It  also  attempts  to  provide  some  guidelines  on  how  an  official 
multilateral  agency  such  as  the  World  Bank  should  deal  with  NGOs.  This 
introduction  provides  a  synopsis  of  the  argument. 
The  debates  surveyed  in  this  paper  are  of  relevance  for  World  Bank 
operations  in  two  ways. 
First,  in  its  policy  based  lending  operations  the  Bank  is  being  urged 
to  complement  its  strictly  economic  conditionality  with  political  conditions 
which  favor  the  development  of  popular  participation  through  civil  associa- 
tions  and  the  development  of  democracy.  It  being  assumed  that  such 
participation  and  democracy  will  further  the  aims  of  good  governance  and 
thus  promote  development.  To  sort  out  this  debate  the  first  section  of  the 
paper  outlines  two  rival  views  of  the  relationship  between  the  state, 
society  and  the  economy.  It  particularly  commends  the  view  of  the 2 
classical  economists  of  the  Scottish  Enlightenment,  who made a  vital 
distinction  between  the  forms  of  government  and  the  characteristics  of  good 
government. 
As  the  bank  is  charged  with  identifying  the  latter  whilst  not  taking  a 
view  on  the  former,  this  distinction  is  of  some operational  significance. 
Particularly  as  is  argued  in  the  first  and  second  parts  of  the  paper,  there 
is  no  necessary  empirical  relationship  between  the  form  of  government  and 
successful  development.  A  particular  form  of  government  --  democracy  --  and 
its  associated  freedom  of  association  and  free  speech,  may however  be 
considered  to  be  valuable  in  promoting  another  end-liberty,  which  is  however 
distinct  from  the  end  of  attaining  opulence  (in  classical  terminology)  which 
from  experience  is  best  promoted  by  the  market.  Hence,  while  democracy 
N 
promotes  liberty,  it  may  not  promote  opulence,  which  depends  upon  an 
efficient  market  economy,  and  which  in  turn  does  not  require  a  democratic 
form  of  government  for  its  maintenance.  This  implies  that  the  World  Bank 
can  (as  it  has  in  the  past)  concentrate  on  the  characteristics  of  good 
government  (policies)  without  getting  entangled  in  the  dangerous  question  of 
the  ideal  form  of  government. 
The  second  way  in  which  the  debates  about  participation  impinge  on  Bank 
operations is through the claim that both the design and implementation of 
World Bank projects and policy based lending will be improved through the 
active association of NGOs. The second part of this paper shows how this 
view is based on the American pluralist tradition of political sociology. 
It outlines the views of the new political economy whiich takes a less benign 
view of the role of pressure groups (NGOs) in promoting opulence, and also 
of another strankof political sociology which views the populism promoted 
by  mass  participation  as  also  a  possible  enemy of  liberty.  Hence  this  part 3 
concludes  that  mass  participation  through  pressure  groups  in  a  democracy  may 
harm  rather  than  aid  the  attainment  of  both  the  ends  of  opulence  and 
liberty. 
The  last  part  of  the  paper  summarizes  the  discussion  and  also  draws  the 
implications  for  Bank  operations.  In  particular  it  emphasizes  that  there  is 
no  presumption,  one  way  or  the  other,  about  the  benefits  from  associating 
NGOs  with  particular  Bank  operations.  The  test  must  be  the  contingent  one 
of  cost-effectiveness.  Thus  the  use  of  NGOs  in  project  lending  --  which 
largely  finance  public  goods  --  must  depend  upon  the  actual  merits  of  each 
case,  namely  whether  this  provides  the  least  cost  mode  of  provision. 
I.  THE  STATE,  ECONOMY AND  SOCIETY  --  TWO RIVAL  VIEWS 
Questions  concerning  ethics,  politics  and  economics  are  necessarily- 
intertwined  in  thinking  about  the  interconnections  between  participation, 
democracy  and  markets.  To  fix  ideas  it  may  be  useful  to  begin  with  a 
summary  of  the  links  that  the 
--  Adam  Smith  and  David  Hume 
politics.  2 
founders  of  the  subject  of  political  economy 
-  saw  between  ethics,  economics  and 
Both  Smith  (in  The  Moral  Sentiments)  and  Hume  recognized  benevolence  as 
the  primary  moral  virtue.  But  they  also  recognized  its  scarcity.  However, 
fortunately,  as  Adam  Smith  was  at  pains  to  show  in  the  Wealth  of  Nations,  a 
market  economy  which  promotes  a  country's  "opulence"  does  not  have  to  depend 
upon  this  moral  virtue  for  its  functioning.  A  market  order  merely  requires 
a  vast  number  of  people  to  deal  and  live  together,  even  if  they  have  no 
personal  relationships,  as  long  as  they  do  not  violate  the  "laws  of 
justice", 
The  resulting  commercial  society  does  promote  some  moral  virtues  -- 
hard  work,  prudence,  thrift  and  self-reliance  (which  have  been  labelled  the "vigorous  virtuesn).>  But  as  they  benefit  the  agent  rather  than  others, 
they  are  inferior  to  the  primary  virtue  --  altruism.  Nevertheless,  as  these 
lower  order  virtues  promote  general  prosperity,  they  do  unintentionally  help 
others.  Hence  the  market  economy  and  the  resulting  commercial  society  is 
neither  immoral  or  amoral. 
A  good  government  on  this  classical  liberal  view  is  one  which  promotes 
"opulence"  through  a  policy  of  promoting  natural  liberty  by  establishing 
laws  of  justice  which  guarantee  free  exchange  and  peaceful  competition.  The 
improvement  of  morality  being  left  to  non-governmental  institutions.  It 
would  be  counterproductive  for  the  State  to  legislate  morality. 
This  classical  liberal  view  of  the  State  seen  as  a  civil  association, 
as  noted  by  Michael  Oakeshott,  goes  back  to  ancient  Greece.  On  this  view 
. 
the  State  is  seen  as  the  custodian  of  laws  which  do  not  seek  to  impose  any 
preferred  pattern  of  ends  (including  abstractions  such  as  the  general 
(social)  welfare,  or  fundamental  rights),  but  which  merely  facilitates 
individuals  to  pursue  their  own  ends. 
This  view  of  the  State  and  its  relationship  to  society  and  the  economy, 
has  been  challenged  in  Western  thought  and  practice,  according  to  Oakeshott, 
by  a  rival  conception  of  the  State  as  an  enterprise  association  --  a  view 
which  has  its  roots  in  the  Judaeo-Christian  tradition.  The  State  is  now 
seen  as  the  manager  of  an  enterprise  seeking  to  use  the  law  for  its  own  sub- 
stantive  purposes,  and  in  particular  for  the  legislation  of  morality.  Since 
the  truce  declared  in  the  18th  century  in  the  European  wars  of  religion,  the 
major  substantive  purposes  sought  by  States  seen  as  enterprise  associations 
"nation-building"  and  "the  promotion  of  some  form  of  egalitarianism".  4  are 
Historically,  both  have  led  to  dirigisme  and  the  suppression  or  control  of 
the  market.  This  needs  further  elaboration. 5 
The  mercantilist  system  which  provided  the  foil  for  Adam  Smith's  great 
work,  arose,  as  Eli  Heckscher  has  shown  (in  his  monumental  study  Mercantil- 
ism),  from  the  desire  of  the  Renaissance  princes  of  Europe  to  consolidate 
their  power  by  incorporating  various  feuding  and  seemingly  disorderly  groups 
which  constituted  the  relatively  weak  states  they  inherited  from  the  ruins 
of  the  Roman  empire,  into  a  "nation".  Its  purpose  was  to  achieve  "unifica- 
tion  and  power",  making  the  "State's  purposes  decisive  in  a  uniform  economic 
sphere  and  to  make  all  economic  activity  subservient  to  considerations 
corresponding  to  the  requirements  of  the  State".  The  same  nationalist 
motive  also  underlay  the  very  similar  system  of  mercantilist  industrial  and 
trade  controls  that  were  established  in  much  of  the  post  war  Third  World. 
In  both  cases  the  unintended  consequences  of  these  controls  instituted 
. 
to  establish  "order"  was  to  breed  "disorder".  As  economic  controls  became 
onerous  people  attempted  to  escape  them  through  various  forms  of  evasion  and 
avoidance.  As  in  18th  century  Europe,  in  the  post  war  Third  World,  dirig- 
isme  bred  corruption,  rent-seeking,  tax  evasion  and  illegal  activities  in 
underground  economies.  The  most  serious  consequence  for  the  State  was  an 
erosion  of  its  fiscal  base  and  the  accompanying  prospect  of  the  unMarxian 
withering  away  of  the  State.  In  both  cases  economic  liberalization  was 
undertaken  to  restore  the  fiscal  base,  and  thence  government  control  over 
what  had  become  ungovernable  economies.  In  some  cases  the  changeover  could 
only  occur  through  revolution  --  most  notably  in  France.  5 
But  the  ensuing  period  of  economic  liberalism  during  the  19th  century's 
great  Age  of  Reform,  was  short-lived  in  part  due  to  the  rise  of  another 
substantive  purpose  that  most  European  states  came  to  adopt  --  the  egalitar- 
ian  ideal  promulgated  by  the  Enlightenment.  Governments  in  many  developing 
countries  also  came  to  espouse  this  ideal  of  socialism.  The  apotheosis  of 6 
this  version  of  the  State  viewed  as  an  enterprise  association  were  the 
communist  countries  seeking  to  legislate  the  socialist  ideal  of  equalizing 
people.  The  collapse  of  their  economies  under  similar  but  even  more  severe 
strains  than  those  that  beset  less  collectivist  neo-mercantilist  economies 
is  now  history.  But  the  desire  to  promote  egalitarianism  through  State 
action  still  lingers  on  as  part  of  social-democratic  political  agendas  in 
many  countries. 
The  locus  and  nature  of  the  argument  of  those  who  want  to  use  the  State 
to  promote  egalitarianism  has  however  shifted  in  a  subtle  way.  In  the  past 
such  activists,  who  sought  to  transform  society  through  State  action,  usual- 
ly  argued  in  favor  of  some  form  of  revolution  whereby  the  "anointed"  would 
seize  power  and  irreversibly  transform  society,  if  necessary  by  indoctrina- 
6 
s 
tion  to  create  a  New  Man.  With  the  revolutionary  route  at  least  tarnished 
by  the  hideous  outcomes  in  communist  countries  --  which  even  fellow 
travellers  now  concede  --  a  new  constitutional  mania7  has  set  in.  This 
emphasizes  substantive  social  and  economic  rights  in  addition  to  the 
well-known  rights  to  liberty  --  freedom  of  speech,  contract,  and  association 
being  amongst  the  most  important-emphasized  by  classical  liberals.  It  seeks 
to  use  the  law  to  enforce  these  "rights"  based  partly  on  "needs",  and  partly 
on  the  "equality  of  respect"  desired  by  a  heterogeneity  of  self-selected 
minorities  differentiated  by  ethnicity,  gender  and/or  sexual  orientation. 
But  no  less  than  in  the  collectivist  societies  that  have  failed,  this 
attempt  to  define  and  legislate  a  newly  discovered  and  dense  structure  of 
rights  (including  for  some  activists  those  of  non-human  plants  and  animals) 
requires  a  vast  expansion  of  the  government's  power  over  people's  lives. 
Their  implementation  moreover  requires  --  at  the  least  --  some  doctoring  of 
the  market  mechanism.  Fortunately  to  date  in  most  Western  societies  this 7 
"rights-chatter"  has  just  remained  that,  but  it  is  an  important  strand  in 
the  participation  and  democracy  debate,  as  we  shall  see. 
While  the  philosophers  of  the  Scottish  Enlightenment  were  quite 
emphatic  about  the  characteristics  of  good  government,  they  were  undogmatic 
about  its  particular  form.  They  were  however  clearheaded  about  the  nature 
of  Political  Man,  and  saw  clearly  why  the  implicit  assumption  about  the 
character  of  the  agents  running  a  State  viewed  as  an  idealistic  enterprise 
association,  namely  that  they  were  Platonic  Guardians,  was  fallacious.  Nor 
were  they  starry  eyed  about  the  propensities  of  majoritarian  democracies  to 
serve  the  public  weal.  Thus  Hume,  in  his  essay  "Of  the  Independence  of 
Parliament"  noted: 
Political  writers  have  established  it  as  a  maxim  that,  in 
contriving  any  system  of  government  and  fixing  the  several  checks 
and  controls  of  the  constitution,  every  man  ought  to  be  supposed  a 
knave  and  to  have  no  other  end,  in  all  his  actions,  than  private 
interest.  By  this  interest  we  must  govern  him  and,  by  means  of 
it,  make  him,  notwithstanding  his  insatiable  avarice  and  ambition, 
co-operate  to  public  good.  Without  this,  say  they,  we  shall  in 
vain  boast  of  the  advantages  of  any  constitution  and  shall  find  in 
the  end  that  we  have  no  security  for  our  liberties  or  possessions 
except  the  goodwill  of  our  rulers;  that  is  we  shall  have  no 
security  at  all. 
It  is  therefore,  a  just  political  maxim  that  every  man  must  be 
supposed  a  knave,  though  at  the  same  time  it  appears  somewhat 
strange  that  a  maxim  should  be  true  in  politics  which  is  false  in 
fact.  But  to  satisfy  us  on  this  head  we  may  consider  that  men  are 
generally  more  honest  in  their  private  than  their  public  capacity, 
and  will  go  greater  lengths  to  serve  a  party  than  when  their  own 
private  interest  alone  is  concerned. 
To  which  we  may  add  that  every  court  or  senate  is  determined  by 
the  greater  number  of  voices,  so  that,  if  self-  interest  influ- 
ences  only  the  majority  (as  it  will  always  do),  the  whole  senate 
follows  the  allurements  of  this  separate  interest  and  acts  as  if 
it  contained  not  one  member  who  had  any  regard  to  public  interest 
and  liberty. 
As  we  shall  see  Hume  was  prescient  about  the  predatory  nature  of 
majoritarian  democracies. 8 
However,  the  obvious  bankruptcy  of  totalitarian  communism,  as  well  as 
the  dirigiste  neo-mercantilism  of  many  developing  country  governments,  has 
led  many  in  the  West  to  assume  that,  this  offers  support  for  their  own 
institutional  arrangements  which  supposedly  combine  a  market  economy  with 
majoritarian  representative  democracy.  Issues  of  good  governance,  which 
since  Adam  Smith  have  been  known  to  determine  the  relative  wealth  of 
nations,  are  assumed  to  be  coterminous  with  the  establishment  of  Western 
style  democracies  in  the  Third  and  Second  World. 
However,  despite  the  moral  virtues  of  democracy  in  preventing  that 
corruption  of  absolute  power  in  autocracies  decried  by  Lord  Acton,  the 
historical  evidence  does  not  support  any  necessary  connection  between  a 
particular  form  of  government  and  the  promotion  of  prosperity.  In  the  post 
. 
war  period  one  only  has  to  consider  the  Far  Eastern  "Gang  of  Four",  or  the 
more  successful  economies  in  Latin  America  --  Chile,  Mexico,  and  until  the 
1980's  Brazil  --  to  realize,  as  Lee  Kwan  Yew  has  recently  been  proclaiming 
from  the  housetops,  that  there  is  no  causal  relationship  between  democracy 
and  development. 
8 
Even  in  the  rocky  transition  from  the  plan  to  the  mar- 
ket,  as  the  contrasting  experience  of  Russia  and  China  show,  glassnost  may 
not  help  perestroika!  This  does  not  mean  that  authoritarianism  or  military 
autocracies  are  either  necessarily  good  for  development. 
The  essential  point  is  that  various  types  of  government,  as  long  as 
they  maintain  the  essentials  of  a  market  order,  can  promote  development. 
But  if  (as  I  do)  one  also  attaches  a  positive  value  to  liberty,  then  demo- 
cracy  is  to  be  preferred  as  a  form  of  government  not  because  of  its 
instrumental  value  in  promoting  prosperity,  but  because  it  promotes  the 
different  but  equally  valuable  end  of  liberty.  As  usual  De  Tocqueville  is 
both  prescient  and  succinct.  "It  is  true",  he  writes  in  The  Ancien  Reeime 9 
that  in  the  long  run  liberty  always  leads  those  who  know  how  to 
keep  it  to  comfort,  well-being,  often  to  riches:  but  there  are 
times  when  it  impedes  the  attainment  of  such  goods;  and  other 
times  when  despotism  alone  can  momentarily  guarantee  their 
enjoyment.  Men  who  take  up  liberty  for  its  material  rewards, 
then,  have  never  kept  it  for  long  . . .  what  in  all  times  has 
attracted  some  men  so  strongly  to  liberty  has  been  itself  alone, 
its  own  particular  charm,  independent  of  the  benefits  it  brings; 
the  pleasure  of  being  able  to  speak,  act,  and  breathe  without 
constraint,  under  no  other  rule  but  that  of  God  and  law.  Who 
seeks  in  liberty  something  other  than  itself  is  born  to  be  a 
slave. 
II.  PARTICIPATION  AND  DEMOCRACY  --  SOCIOLOGISTS  VS  ECONOMISTS 
De  Tocqueville,  however,  is  even  more  relevant  for  our  subject  as  the 
progenitor  of  what  has  become  the  school  of  "pluralist  democracy"  amongst 
American  political  sociologists.  This  is  another  important  strand  in  the 
current  debates  about  participation,  markets  and  democracy.  Any  textbook  on 
political  sociology  will  inform  the  reader  that  there  are  three  theoretical- 
perspectives  on  the  subject:  the  class  model  (due  to  Marx  and  his  follow- 
ers);  the  elite  model  (due  to  Pareto,  Mosca,  Michels  and  Weber)  and  the 
American  pluralist  model  which  harks  back  to  De  Tocqueville's  classic 
Democracv  in  America.  The  first  has  been  discredited  by  the  collapse  of 
communism.  The  second  by  the  failures  of  dirigiste  modernizing  elites  in 
many  parts  of  the  Third  World.  This  leaves  the  third  --  almost  by  default 
--  as  the  remaining  theoretical  perspective  that  American  political  socio- 
logists  are  now  seeking  to  apply  to  the  Third  World. 
In  his  great  book  Democracv  in  America,  De  Tocqueville  maintained  that: 
"all  the  causes  which  contribute  to  the  maintenance  of  a  democratic  republic 
in  the  United  States  are  reducible  to  three  heads:  I.  The  peculiar  and 
accidental  situation  in  which  Providence  has  placed  the  Americans.  II.  The 
laws.  III.  The  manners  and  customs  of  the  people"  (Vol.  I.  Ch.  XVII).  Of 
these  he  assigned  the  greatest  weight  to  customs.  He  wrote: 10 
These  three  great  causes  serve,  no  doubt  to  regulate  and  direct 
American  democracy;  but  if  they  were  to  be  classed  in  their  proper 
order,  I  should  say  that  physical  circumstances  are  less  efficient 
than  the  laws,  and  the  laws  infinitely  less  so  than  the  customs  of 
the  people.  I  am  convinced  that  the  most  advantageous  situation 
and  the  best  possible  laws  cannot  maintain  a  constitution  in  spite 
of  the  customs  of  a  country;  while  the  latter  may  turn  to  some 
advantage  the  most  unfavorable  positions  and  the  worst  laws. 
Amongst  the  customs  that  De  Tocqueville  identified  as  being  most 
important  for  maintaining  democracy  in  America  were  the  myriad  civil 
voluntary  associations  he  found  in  the  country. 
The  political  associations  that  exist  in  the  United  States  are 
only  a  single  feature  in  the  midst  of  the  immense  assemblage  of 
associations  in  that  country.  Americans  of  all  ages,  all  condi- 
tions,  and  all  dispositions  constantly  form  associations.  They 
have  not  only  commercial  and  manufacturing  companies,  in  which  all 
take  part,  but  associations  of  a  thousand  other  kinds,  religious, 
moral,  serious,  futile,  general  or  restricted,  enormous  or  dimin- 
utive.  The  Americans  make  associations  to  give  entertainments,  to 
found  seminaries,  to  build  inns,  to  construct  churches,  to  diffuse  s 
books,  to  send  missionaries  to  the  antipodes;  in  this  manner  they 
found  hospitals,  prisons,  and  schools.  If  it  is  proposed  to 
inculcate  some  truth  or  to  foster  some  feeling  by  the  encourage- 
ment  of  a  great  example,  they  form  a  society.  Wherever  at  the 
head  of  some  new  undertaking  you  see  the  government  in  France,  or 
a  man  of  rank  in  England,  in  the  United  States  you  will  be  sure  to 
find  an  association.  (Vol.  II,  Ch.  V) 
These  myriad  of  voluntary  associations  (or  NGOs  as  they  would  be  called 
today),  moreover,  provided  the  bulwark  against  the  tyranny  of  the  central 
executive  in  democracies,  according  to  De  Tocqueville,  once  the  traditional 
aristocracy  which,  with  its  sense  of  "noblesse  oblige",  usually  stood 
between  the  rulers  and  the  ruled  in  the  Ancien  Regimes  in  Europe,  had  been 
extinguished  with  the  rise  of  democracy.  These  voluntary  associations  were 
necessary  as  an  intermediating  layer  between  the  ruling  elites  and  the 
masses  to  prevent  the  abuse  of  power  by  the  elites,  and  to  allow  the  ordin- 
ary  citizen  to  participate  in  the  political  process.  Thus,  he  wrote: 
In  aristocratic  nations  secondary  bodies  form  natural  associations 
which  hold  abuses  of  power  in  check.  In  countries  where  such 
associations  do  not  exist,  if  private  people  did  not  artificially 
and  temporarily  create  something  like  them,  I  see  no  other  dike  to 11 
hold  back  tyranny  of  whatever  sort,  and  a  great  nation  might  with 
impunity  be  oppressed  by  some  tiny  faction  or  by  a  single  man. 
Despite  the  critique  of  the  American  pluralist  model  which  follows,  it 
is  of  the  greatest  importance  to  note  that  this  essentially  political  role 
of  voluntary  associations  in  maintaining  freedom,  which  was  De  Tocqueville's 
main  concern  and  principal  insight,  still  remains  valid.  It  requires  the 
freedom  to  associate  and  of  free  speech  to  be  maintained.  But  whether  a 
polity  dominated  by  voluntary  associations,  or  what  we  would  today  call 
pressure  groups  or  interest  groups  necessarily  serves  the  cause  of  the 
market  economy  and  thence  development,  is  an  open  question.  But  in  answer- 
ing  it  is  of  vital  importance  to  note  that  such  associations,  because  they 
must  have  substantive  purposes  to  exist,must  necessarily  be  enterprise 
associations. 
However,  starting  with  Bentley  and  culminating  in  the  works  of  Truman 
and  Latham,  an  influential  strand  of  American  political  sociology  has  argued 
that  free  competition  amongst  pressure  groups  leads  through  a  process  simi- 
lar  to  Adam  Smith's  "invisible  hand"  to  subserving  the  general  welfare,  even 
though  each  group  is  only  promoting  its  own  particular  interest.  Perfect 
competition  amongst  interest  groups,  with  the  State  acting  as  an  umpire,  is 
thus  the  political  analogue  of  the  perfect  competition  paradigm  of  the 
economist.  As  in  the  economic  model  with  free  entry  and  exit,  the  size  of 
the  associations  would  not  necessarily  pose  a  problem,  because  any  untoward 
pressure  by  one  group  would  call  forth  pressure  by  a  countervailing  group, 
if  necessary  being  newly  created  for  this  purpose.  Thus,  as  Truman,  for 
example  saw  it, 
in  the  first  place,  . . .  most  pressure  groups  would  be  weak  and 
divided  in  those  circumstances  in  which  they  asked  for  too  much 
from  society,  since  their  members  also  had  "overlapping"  member- 
ships  in  other  groups  with  different  interests  and  would  thus 
oppose  excessive  demands...in  the  second  place,  there  were 12 
"potential  groupsw  that  would  arise  and  organize  to  do  battle  with 
the  special  interests  if  the  special  interests  got  too  far  out  of 
line.  (Olson,  p.  124) 
This  school  therefore  thinks  that  the  pressure  group  equilibrium  would  be 
just  and  desirable. 
This  school,  moreover,  tended  to  put  group  interests  above  the 
interests  of  the  individuals  which  composed  the  group.  As  Bentley  (p.  211) 
stated:  "There  is  no  group  without  its  interest.  An  interest,  as  the  term 
will  be  used  here  ,  is  the  equivalent  of  a  group".  This  thought  also 
underlies  the  notion  of  the  "corporatist  state"  which  has  found  much  favor 
with  continental  European  thinkers  since  the  19th  century.  But  corporatism 
is  no  friend  of  the  market.  In  fact  many  supporters  of  the  pluralist  model 
look  upon  the  growth  of  economically  motivated  pressure  groups  as  providing 
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desirable  restraints  on  the  market.  Thus  Truman  (p.  61)  wrote: 
There  are  . . .  a  number  of  reasons  for  the  prevalence  of 
associations  growing  out  of  economic  institutions  .  . .  .  There  has 
been  a  series  of  disturbances  and  dislocations  consequent  upon  the 
utopian  attempt,  as  Polanyi  calls  it,  to  set  up  a  completely 
self-regulating  market  system.  This  attempt  involved  a  policy  of 
treating  fictitious  factors  of  land,  labor  and  capital  as  if  they 
were  real,  ignoring  the  fact  that  they  stood  for  human  beings  or 
influences  closely  affecting  the  welfare  of  humans.  Applications 
of  this  policy  inevitably  meant  suffering  and  dislocation  -- 
unemployment,  wide  fluctuations  in  prices,  waste,  and  so  forth. 
These  disturbances  inevitably  produced  associations  --  of  owners, 
of  workers,  of  farmers  --  operating  upon  government  to  mitigate 
and  control  the  ravages  of  the  system  through  tariffs,  subsidies, 
wage  guarantees,  social  insurance  and  the  like, 
This  benign  view  of  pressure  groups  has  been  questioned  by  Mancur 
Olson.  Instead  of  assuming  that  all  interests  can  be  organized  with  equal 
facility,  he  asks  the  basic'question  for  an  economist:  what  are  the  costs 
and  benefits  for  individuals  to  join  various  interest  groups? 
Unlike  the  rather  vague  objectives  assigned  to  participation  in 
pressure  group  activity  by  political  sociologists,  Olson  rightly  looks  upon 
these  groups  at  least  in  the  economic  sphere  as  engaging  in  attempts  to  use 13 
the  political  process  to  obtain  special  economic  benefits  for  their  members. 
These  can  in  general  be  described  as  "subsidies".  This  pressure  group 
politics  is  of  necessity  redistributive  economics.  Olson  argued  that  small 
concentrated  interest  groups  are  more  likely  to  form  and  succeed  in  their 
aim  of  influencing  the  democratic  political  process  to  their  ends  than 
larger,  more  diffused  groups.  For  the  pay  off  from  any  given  "benefit" 
acquired  through  the  political  process  for  any  individual  member  of  a 
pressure  group  diminishes  with  the  size  of  the  group.  Also  the  larger  the 
group  the  more  difficult  it  becomes  for  it  to  coalesce  to  subserve  its  aims 
because  of  the  ubiquitousness  of  the  free-rider  problem  in  organizing 
collective  action.  A  member  who  will  benefit  from  the  collective  "benefit" 
even  if  he  does  not  participate  in  its  acquisition,  will  attempt  to  shirk 
bearing  his  share  of  the  costs  of  the  collective  action  if  he  can  get  away 
with  it.  An  example  of  the  relevance  of  Olson's  theory  is  the  stylized  fact 
that  in  developing  countries  with  a  preponderance  of  farmers,  agriculture  is 
taxed  for  the  benefit  of  urban  consumers,  while  in  developed  countries  it  is 
subsidized  at  the  cost  of  a  much  larger  number  of  urban  consumers. 
Those  larger  pressure  groups  which  do  form  and  are  effective,  such  as 
trade  unions,  attract  members  according  to  Olson  by  offering  "selective 
benefits",  not  collective  benefits.  Thus  members  may  have  to  join  trade 
unions  if  union  membership  is  a  condition  for  obtaining  a  particular  job. 
But  this  is  likely  to  leave  the  common  interests  of  many  large  groups 
unorganized.  As  Olson  concludes:  "Only  when  groups  are  small,  or  when  they 
are  fortunate  enough  to  have  an  independent  source  of  selective  incentives  , 
will  they  organize  or  act  to  achieve  their  objectives  . . . .  But  the  large 
unorganized  groups  [with  common  interests]  not  only  provide  evidence  for  the 
basic  argument  of  this  study:  they  also  suffer  if  it  is  true"  (p.  167). 14 
Thus,  far  from  being  the  benign  social  equilibrium  of  the  political 
sociologists,  for  the  economist,  a  pressure  group  equilibrium  may not  serve 
the  common weal. 
Olson  later  (1982)  went  on  to  argue  that  because  of  the  deadweight 
costs  of  the  taxes  and  subsidies  associated  with  a  pressure  group  equilib- 
rium,  an  economy  riddled  with  pressure  groups  is  likely  to  bear  a  heavy 
burden  of  such  costs,  and  hence  likely  to  have  sluggish  growth.  He blamed 
the  decline  of  nations  on  the  growth  of  interest  groups  whose  aim  must 
necessarily  be  to  use  the  political  process  to  redistribute  income  to 
themselves.  This  by  necessity  --  given  the  fixed  economic  pie  at  any  point 
of  time  --  is  a  zero-sum  game,  a  Hobbesian  war  of  all  against  all.  Whether 
this  view  is  consonant  with  economic  history  remains  controversial  as  wit- 
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ness  the  conflicting  claims  in  the  collection  of  essays  in  Mueller. 
A  more  serious  challenge  to  Olson's  malign  view  of  interest  group 
activity  has  been  provided  by  Gary  Becker,  who has  sought  to  provide  a 
rigorous  formulation  of  a  model  of  competition  amongst  pressure  groups  for 
political  influence.  He partially  restores  the  more  benign  view  of  such 
participation  of  the  political  sociologists. 
Becker  models  the  influence  exerted  by  pressure  groups  in  terms  of 
costs  and  benefits  --  much  as  Olson  --  and  reaches  similar  conclusions  about 
the  efficacy  of  smaller  over  larger  groups,  because  of  the  problem  of 
controlling  free  riding.  But  his  introduction  of  the  deadweight  costs  of 
the  taxes  and  subsidies,  which  comprise  the  pressure  group  equilibrium,  and 
which  effect  individual's  utility,  allows  him  to  put  a  more  benign  picture 
on  the  Cournot-Nash  noncooperative  political  game he  models.  In  this  game 
the  influence  that  pressure  groups  (divided  into  those  who pay  taxes  and 
those  who  receive  subsidies)  is  assumed  to  be  zero-sum.  As  in  the  political 15 
sociology  literature  there  is  a  countervailing  "potential"  taxpayer  group  to 
every  group  that  seeks  subsidies,  and  as  the  overall  political  budget 
constraint  implies  that,  the  amount  raised  in  taxes  equals  the  amount  spent 
in  subsidies:  "aggregate  influence  is  zero;  increased  influence  of  some 
groups  decreases  the  influence  of  others  by  equal  amounts"  (Becker,  1983,  p. 
376).  Moreover  because  of  the  deadweight  costs  of  both  taxation  and 
subsidization  the  game  is  negative  sum  in  these  instruments. 
These  assumptions  allow  him  to  derive  a  number  of  remarkable  "second 
best"  efficiency  theorems  about  the  pressure  group  equilibrium.  Thus 
because  an  increase  in  the  deadweight  costs  of  taxes  (subsidies),  raises  the 
costs  (reduces  the  benefits),  it  discourages  pressure  by  the  relevant 
pressure  group.  Then:  "if  the  gain  to  groups  that  benefit  exceeds  the  loss 
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to  groups  that  suffer,  and  if  access  to  political  influence  were  the  same 
for  all  groups,  gainers  could  exert  more  political  pressures  than  losers, 
and  a  policy  would  tend  to  be  implemented"  (Becker  1988,  p.  101).  This,  as 
he  notes,  is  the  famous  compensation  principle  for  Pareto  optimality  in  wel- 
fare  economics,  and  remarkably  it  is  now  resurrected  without  actual 
compensation  having  to  be  paid!  Equally  remarkable  is  the  theorem  that: 
"political  policies  that  raise  efficiency  are  more  likely  to  be  adopted  than 
polices  that  lower  efficiency"  (Becker,  1983,  p.  384). 
But  as  Becker  (1988,  p.  91-2)  himself  notes  in  passing: 
Aggregate  efficiency  should  be  defined  not  only  net  of  deadweight 
costs  and  benefits  of  taxes  and  subsidies,  but  also  net  of 
expenditures  on  the  production  of  political  pressure  . . .  since 
these  expenditures  are  only  "rent-seeking"  inputs  in  the  deter- 
mination  of  policies.  Therefore,  efficiency  would  be  raised  if 
all  groups  could  agree  to  reduce  their  expenditures  on  political 
influence. 
But  this  admission  undercuts  much  of  the  benign  character  of  the 
pressure  group  equilibrium.  For  with  perfect  competition  amongst  pressure 16 
groups,  we  would  also  expect  perfect  competition  amongst  the  rent  seekers. 
That,  as  is  well  known,  will  lead  to  them  spending  an  amount  in  rent-seeking 
equal  to  the  total  rents  sought.  This  plus  whatever  expenditures  "taxpay- 
ers"  have  to  expend  to  counter  the  predatoriness  of  those  seeking  subsidies, 
amounts  to  the  deadweight  rectangles  of  rent-seeking  costs  which  will 
invariably  outweigh  any  of  the  conventional  Harberger  triangle  losses  which 
the  Becker  framework  seeks  to  minimize.  The  Becker  efficiency  conclusions 
about  a  pressure  group  equilibrium  would  thus  seem  less  than  robust,  and 
once  the  deadweight  costs  of  rent-seeking  are  included  it  would  seem  that 
the  more  gloomy  view  taken  by  Olson  about  the  anti-growth  and  anti-develop- 
ment  effects  of  an  economy  dominated  by  pressure  groups  is  more  persuasive. 
Further  doubt  on  the  benign  view  that  emerges  from  Becker  of  a  pressure 
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group  dominated  economy  --  or  as  I  prefer  to  call  it  a  factional  state  --  is 
cast  by  another  of  his  theorems,  which  follows  directly  from  his  assumptions 
that  both  taxpayers  and  subsidy  recipients  are  interested  in  reducing  the 
deadweight  costs  of  taxes  and  subsidies.  Not  surprisingly  the  commodity  tax 
structure  that  will  then  be  chosen  in  his  pressure  group  equilibrium  will 
follow  the  so-called  Ramsey  tax  rule  --  that  is  tax  rates  will  be  related 
inversely  to  the  elasticity  of  demand  for  the  good,  as  this  minimizes  the 
Harberger  triangle  loss  for  collecting  any  given  revenue.  But  as  Brennan 
and  Buchanan  have  shown,  the  Ramsey  tax  rule  is  also  the  one  which  will  be 
adopted  by  what  I  call  an  autonomous  revenue-maximizing  predatory  state. 
This  is  not  merely  coincidental.  It  underlies  the  basically  predatory 
nature  of  a  distributivist  pressure  group  dominated  democracy!  That  the 
Ramsey  rule  would  also  be  followed  by  Platonic  Guardians,  who  by  assumption 
seek  to  limit  revenues  to  fund  essential  public  goods,  offers  cold  comfort 
to  more  cynical  political  economists  who  see  revenue  maximization  as  the 17 
hallmark  of  predatoriness. 
Further  doubt  is  cast  on  the  benign  view  of  a  polity  and  economy 
dominated  by  pressure  groups  by  the  imperfect  empirical  evidence  which  is 
available  about  the  outcomes  in  economies  dominated  by  them,  as  well  as  by 
the  divergences  between  theory  and  actuality  about  the  characteristics  of 
existing  pressure  groups. 
On  the  first,  the  Lal-Myint  comparative  study  on  the  political  economy 
of  poverty,  equity  and  growth,  attempted  to  classify  the  21  countries  stud- 
ied  into  self-explanatory  categories  defining  the  central  attribute  of  their 
polity  during  the  period  1950-85.  The  two  major  categories  were  of  states 
which  were  classed  as  autonomous  and  factional.  In  the  former  the  State  was 
seen  to  stand  above  the  factional  pressures  exerted  by  its  constituents,  and 
s 
to  subserve  its  own  ends.  In  terms  of  these  ends  this  category  subdivided 
into  the  benevolent  Platonic  Guardian  (or  one  should  also  add  the  more 
darker  Nietzchian)  state  attempting  to  maximize  some  social  welfare  function 
as  it  saw  it,  and  the  more  self-serving  predatory  state  seeking  to  maximize 
the  revenue  which  the  "monarch"  could  spend  at  his  pleasure.  The  second 
category  of  factional  states  were  those  where  the  States  subserved  the 
interests  of  those  who  succeeded  in  capturing  the  government.  The  main 
difference  between  the  two  types  --  oligarchic  and  majoritarian  democratic 
__  distinguished  within  the  category  was  based  on  the  composition  of  the 
polity.  Table  1  provides  the  classification  of  the  countries  in  these  broad 
categories,  and  a  rank  ordering  by  growth  rates.  It  is  apparent  that, 
first,  any  inference  about  any  strong  correlation  (leave  alone  causation) 
between  forms  of  government  and  economic  performance  is  insecure,  but  that, 
secondly,  by  and  large,  the  performance  of  the  autonomous  states  tends  to  be 























TABLE  1 
Growth  And  Type  Of  Polity 
Hong  Kong  8.9 
Singapore  8.3 
Malaysia  6.9 
Thailand  6.7 
Brazil  6.6 
Mexico  5.7 
Malta  )  5.6 
Turkey  )  5.6 
WPt  5.4 
Indonesia  5.3 
Costa  Rica  5.0 
Colombia  4.7 
Sri  Lanka  4.7 
Malawi  4.3 
Peru  4.1 
Nigeria  3.7 
Jamaica  3.3 
Mauritius  2.9 
Madagasgar  2.0 
Ghana  1.3 
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Ranked  in  terms  of  growth  performance. 19 
The  second  piece  of  factual  evidence  which  casts  some  doubt  on  the 
perfectly  competitive  pressure  group  model  is  the  finding  for  both  developed 
and  developing  countries  that,  apart  from  the  large  associations  that  can 
utilize  selective  incentives  to  gain  recruits,  most  other  associations  tend 
to  be  dominated  by  relatively  more  affluent,  better  educated  and  middle  or 
upper-middle  class  members.  As  the  political  scientist  Schattschneider  put 
it  succinctly:  "The  flaw  in  the  pluralist  heaven  is  that  the  heavenly  chorus 
sings  with  such  an  upper  class  accent.  Probably  about  90  per  cent  of  the 
people  cannot  get  into  the  pressure  group  system"  (pp.  34-5). 
As  usual  an  economist  has  tried  to  provide  an  explanation.  The 
political  sociologists  explained  this  finding  by  arguing  that  "the  higher 
status  individual  has  a  greater  stake  in  politics,  he  has  greater  skills, 
H 
more  resources,  great  awareness  of  political  matters,  he  is  exposed  to  more 
communication  about  politics  he  interacts  with  others  who  participate" 
(Verba  and  Nie,  p.  126).  By  contrast  Hirschman,  argues  that  it  is  because 
high  status  individuals  are  also  relatively  high  income  ones,  they  are 
likely  to  have  satiated  their  wants  for  various  private  goods.  They  "may 
[then]  engage  in  politics  because  they  have  become  disenchanted  with  the 
pursuit  of  happiness  via  the  private  route"  (p.  75).  Moreover,  unlike  the 
free  riders  who  populate  the  Olsonian  collective  action  universe,  Hirsch- 
man's  high  status  political  activists  participate 
because  there  is  much  fulfillment  associated  with  the  citizen's 
exertions  for  the  public  happiness.  These  exertions  are  in  effect 
often  compared  with  the  pleasurable  experiences  of  eating  and 
drinking  . . . .  It  is  in  the  very  struggle  for  justice  and  liberty 
that  the  thirst  is  quenched  and  the  craving  is  gratified.  Who 
then,  would  want  to  miss  all  that  active  pleasure  and  get  a  free 
ride  to  what  is  at  best  the  comfortable,  and  usually  somewhat 
disappointing,  outcome  of  these  processes?  (P.  91) 
Though  this  might  explain  why  many  of  the  principals  of  NGOs  may  be 
altruistic,  it  does  not  tell  us  whether  their  actions  serve  the  interests  of 20 
the  economy  or  polity.  Certainly  in  some  European  countries,  e.g.,  Britain, 
it  is  arguable  whether  the  influence  of  the  "chattering  classes"  has  helped 
rather  than  hindered  their  economic  development  (see  Weiner,  Letwin). 
Finally,  there  is  the  role  of  mass  participation  and  its  effects  on 
electoral  politics.  Here  studies  of  participation  in  voting  in  those  demo- 
cratic  countries  without  compulsory  voting,  have  shown:  first,  that  voters 
are  generally  badly  informed  in  most  democracies,  and  second,  that  in  many 
democracies  the  percentage  voting  in  elections  is  not  very  much  more  than 
half  of  those  eligible  to  vote. 
Economists  have  again  provided  a  "rational  choice"  explanation  of  this 
ignorance  and  apathy  in  voting  behavior.  Given  that  the  act  of  voting 
involves  some  positive  costs  to  the  individual,  whereas  the  probability  of 
his  vote  affecting  the  electoral  outcome  is  infinitesimally  small,  the 
paradox  as  Downs  noted,  is  not  why  there  is  a  low  voter  turn  out,  but  any 
turnout  at  all!  A  similar  argument  applies  to  the  costs  and  benefits  of 
being  well  informed. 
The  role  of  parties,  party  allegiance  and  the  "competitive  struggle  for 
the  peoples  vote"  which  Schumpeter  (1950,  p.  269),  identified  as  the  most 
distinctive  feature  of  democracy,  then  plays  a  central  role  in  Downs  theory 
of  democracy.  Its  most  important  positive  conclusion  (of  course  dependent 
on  the  simplifying  assumptions  on  which  it  is  based)  is  the  so-called  median 
voter  theorem  (which  was  first  derived  by  Hotelling).  This  shows  that  if 
voters  can  be  ranked  along  a  single  dimension  (usually  defined  as  the  left- 
right  spectrum),  have  single  peaked  preferences,  and  there  are  only  two 
political  parties,  then  in  a  majoritarian  democracy  both  parties  will  have 
an  interest  in  converging  on  programs  that  appeal  to  the  median  voter.  This 
has  been  used  by  Stigler,  Meltzer  and  Richards,  amongst  others  in  the 21 
economic  field  to  explain  both  the  growth  of  government  transfers  in 
democracies  as  well  as  their  inevitable  capture  by  the  middle-class  (the 
so-called  median  voter). 
One  implication  of  these  median  voter  models  of  the  growth  of 
distributivist  welfare  states  --  which  in  effect  become  transfer  states  -- 
is  that  the  political  pressure  for  redistribution  and  hence  the  growth  of 
government  will  decrease  with  growing  prosperity.  For  with  growth,  as  well 
as  the  operation  of  the  transfer  state,  the  median  income  comes  to  be  closer 
to  the  mean.  It  being  noted  that,  as  in  the  pressure  group  model,  because 
of  the  deadweight  costs  associated  with  the  taxes  and  subsidies  of  the 
transfer  state,  it  will  not  be  in  the  interest  of  the  median  voter  to 
redistribute  all  the  income  above  the  median  to  himself.  Peltzman  has 
s 
provided  a  richer  model  in  the  median  voter  tradition  which  removes  some  of 
the  shortcomings  of  the  simpler  versions.  He  has  also  tested  it  with  cross 
country  regressions  which  include  many  developing  countries  and  found  it 
provides  a  fairly  good  explanation  of  the  growth  of  government.  The 
Lal-Myint  study  found  that  the  Peltzman  model  also  provided  a  statistically 
significant  explanation  for  the  differences  in  the  levels  of  government 
non-defense  expenditures  in  the  21  countries  studied, 
The  relatively  jaundiced  view  of  the  economic  effects  of  majoritarian 
democracies,  emerging  from  this  strand  of  the  new  political  economy,  is 
complemented  by  that  of  a  number  of  political  sociologists,  e.g.,  Lipset, 
who  do  not  see  a  very  high  level  of  political  participation  to  be  in  the 
interest  of  democracy.  The  example  of  Hitler's  Germany  weighs  particularly 
heavily  on  their  minds.  The  rise  of  the  Nazis  through  the  ballot  box  was 
based  on  their  activating  many  previously  inactive  groups.  This  school 
therefore  fears  that  if  non-elite  political  participation  is  too  widespread, 22 
demagogues  may  exploit  the  badly  informed  by  playing  to  the  "irrational" 
impulses  of  the  masses.  A  similar  view  is  taken  by  those  who  see  "populism" 
as  the  bane  of  Latin  American  politics  and  the  cause  of  much  of  its  bad 
economic  performance  in  recent  decades  (see  Dornbusch  and  Edwards). 
By  contrast  other  political  sociologists  adopt  a  common  belief  amongst 
the  unreflective  that,  as  Verba  and  Nie  put  it:  "Where  few  take  part  in 
decisions  there  is  little  democracy;  the  more  participation  there  is  in 
decisions,  the  more  democracy  there  is"  (1972,  p.  1).  If  this  is  merely 
made  a  definition  of  democracy  then  one  cannot  cavil  with  it.  But  then  one 
has  to  ask,  with  the  political  economists  and  those  political  sociologists 
who  take  a  darker  view  of  the  consequences  of  such  mass  participation, 
whether  the  Hobbesian  state  of  nature  such  a  "democracy"  might  engender  on 
. 
Olson's  view,  or  the  loss  of  liberty  itself  on  Lipset's  view,  makes  this 
"democracy"  worth  having. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS  FOR  WORLD  BANK  POLICY 
Thus  at  the  end  of  the  above  discussion,  we  are  left  to  swim  in  very 
treacherous  waters,  when  we  try  to  work  through  the  effects  of  those 
slippery  but  seemingly  obvious  concepts  "participation"  and  "democracy".  To 
avoid  drowning  in  them  it  may  be  best  as  the  great  Scottish  philosophers 
emphasized  to  concentrate  not  on  forms  of  government  but  the  characteristics 
of  good  government-  on  policies.  As  the  World  Bank  is  charged  with  advising 
on  the  latter  and  forbidden  to  deal  with  the  former,  it  should  find  this 
view  congenial. 
The  most  important  aspect  of  good  government  for  economic  development 
(and  hopefully  for  liberty),  as  we  have  noted,  is  for  the  state  to  view  its 
functions  as  those  of  a  civil  and  not  an  enterprise  association.  This  means 
that,  besides  providing  the  essential  public  goods  at  the  least  cost  in 23 
terms  of  revenue,  it  should  not  engage  in  the  promotion  of  any  particular 
morality  --  be  it  that  based  on  egalitarianism,  or  fundamental  rights. 
As  redistributive  political  games  are  necessarily  zero-sum,  and  also 
involve  deadweight  costs,  a  good  government  will  not  exacerbate  the  natural 
proclivity  of  human  beings  to  use  the  political  market  place  to  achieve  what 
they  cannot  obtain  through  the  private  market  place.  The  damage  that  the 
politicization  of  economic  life  can  cause  for  development  has  been  a  persis- 
tent  theme  in  the  writings  of  Lord  Bauer.  His  initially  lonely  position  has 
been  amply  justified  by  experience  in  the  last  two  decades.  To  the  extent 
the  cry  for  greater  participation  in  the  mechanics  of  development  is  one  for 
accentuating  these  redistributive  games,  it  needs  to  be  eschewed. 
We  have  also  argued  that  more  recent  versions  of  this  game  have  come  to 
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be  based  on  so-called  social  and  economic  rights,  whose  upholding,  it  is 
claimed,  must  form  the  basis  for  the  "real"  participation  of  the  masses  and 
hence  "genuine"  democracy.  But  democracy  as  we  have  argued  can  only  have 
instrumental  value,  and  if  combined  with  the  State  viewed  as  an  enterprise 
association  can  be  inimical  both  to  the  ultimate  ends  of  promoting  popular 
"opulence"  and  liberty. 
This  does  not  mean  that  "participation"  viewed  as  affirming  the 
classical  liberal  freedoms  to  associate  and  speak  one's  mind  is  not  valu- 
able.  It  is  --  as  it  promotes  liberty.  But  this  is  a  different  end,  though 
no  less  valuable  than  opulence.  The  latter,  experience  has  shown,  is  best 
promoted  by  markets.  But  because  participation  --  in  the  above  limited 
sense  --  and  markets  are  thus  instrumentally  desirable,  it  does  not  follow, 
as  some  seek  to  claim  that,  the  latter  requires  the  former.  This  is  just 
another  reflection  of  the  fact  that  there  is  no  necessary  causal  link 
between  democracy  and  development.  We  may  wish  to  promote  the  former 24 
because  it  at  least  helps  to  prevent  tyranny  and  hence  promotes  liberty  --  a 
valued  end.  But  it  is  a  fallacy  to  give  in  to  the  natural  human  failing  to 
believe  that  all  good  things  go  together  --  so  that  democracy  will  promote 
development.  But  neither,  I  hasten  to  add,  is  there  any  necessary  link 
between  authoritarianism  and  development. 
Nor  does  it  appear  essential  either  for  democracy  or  development  to 
promote  voluntary  civil  associations,  despite  the  claims  of  the  pluralist 
American  tradition.  Particularly  in  an  enterprise  state,  they  can  (as 
discussed  above)  become  the  instruments  of  competitive  rent-seeking  with 
inimical  effects  on  economic  development.  By  their  very  nature  these 
pressure  groups  must  themselves  be  enterprise  associations.  For  the  state 
to  promote  any  of  them  would  amount  to  its  endorsing  the  aims  of  that  parti- 
e 
cular  enterprise  --  something  which  a  state  viewed  as  a  civil  association  is 
charged  not  do. 
But  in  a  such  a  state,  there  would  also  be  no  need  to  take  any  baleful 
view  of  these  associations.  Though  there  is  always  the  danger,  as  with 
religious  associations  which  seek  to  convert  the  state  into  an  enterprise 
association,  that  they  may  seek  to  use  the  political  process  to  subvert  the 
state  as  a  civil  association  by  attempting  to  take  it  over.  The  bulwarks 
that  can  feasibly  be  erected  against  such  outcomes,  and  others  which  subvert 
the  state  seen  as  a  civil  association,  is  the  subject  matter  of  much  current 
research  in  so-called  constitutional  economics,  but  it  lies  beyond  the  scope 
of  this  paper. 
Nor  would  there  be  a  presumption,  one  way  or  the  other,  about  using 
these  voluntary  private  (enterprise)  associations  in  the  provision  of  public 
goods  (including  programs  which  alleviate  absolute  poverty,  which  classical 
liberalism  views  as  a  public  good).  10  This  would  depend  on  the  actual 25 
merits  of  the  case,  as  judged  by  the  standard  efficiency  criterion:  is  this 
the  least  cost  way  of  providing  a  particular  level  of  the  relevant  public 
good.  As  most  World  Bank  project  lending  provides  finance  for  investments 
in  public  goods,  the  association  of  so-called  NGOs  in  bank  projects  must 
remain  an  empirical  and  contingent  matter.  There  can  be  no  general  presump- 
tion  about  its  desirability.  As  we  have  argued,  any  attempt  to  do  so 
through  the  notions  of  "participation"  and  "democracy"  remains  seriously 
flawed. 
But  are  there  specific  types  of  Bank  projects  in  which  involving  NGOs 
might  on  the  basis  of  existing  evidence  be  useful?  And  can  anything  be  said 
about  the  types  of  NGOs  that  the  Bank  might  find  useful  in  its  work? 
A  Bank  report  by  Holt,  identified  three  conditions  for  participation 
s 
(defined  as  "the  poor's  influence  in  decisionmaking  in  poverty  reduction 
programs")  as  a  necessary  component  of  effective  and  sustainable  poverty 
reduction  programs.  These  were: 
(a>  when  the  poor  possess  information  not  known  to  outsiders  that 
is  necessary  for  program  success; 
(b)  when  collective  action  is  required  for  effective  management; 
Cc)  when  the  government  must  rely  on  poor  people  to  expand  the 
public  resources  that  are  put  into  projects. 
Amongst  the  sectors  identified  as  having  benefitted  from  participation 
were  :  agriculture  (including  forestry,  livestock,  irrigation  and  agricul- 
tural  extension);  rural  water  supply;  urban  development  (including  urban 
water  supply);  environment  and  resettlement;  and  credit  (group  lending 
schemes  and  micro-enterprise). 
Of  the  three  criteria  listed  above  the  importance  of  (a)  and  (c)  cannot 
be  gainsaid.  But  these  used  to  be  part  of  standard  procedures  for  the 
design  of  World  Bank  projects.  There  may  be  critical  technical  local  know- 
ledge  (to  be  distinguished  from  preferences),  for  instance  about  local 26 
ecology  or  customs,  on  which  the  success  of  a  particular  investment  project 
will  depend.  But  certainly  in  the  1970s  when  I  was  associated  with  the 
Bank's  project  evaluation  work,  particularly  in  agriculture,  obtaining  this 
local  knowledge  through  site  visits  at  the  design  stage  of  the  project  was 
considered  standard  practice.  Assuming  this  has  not  changed,  to  label  this 
process  as  "participation"  is  to  use  emotive  language,  which  given  the 
slippery  nature  of  the  concept  of  "participation"  discussed  above,  is  likely 
to  aid  neither  clarity  of  thought  nor  the  relief  of  poverty. 
Similarly,  in  many  social  sectors  such  as  health  and  education  it  has 
been  part  of  Bank  practice,  in  the  project  design,  to  include  some  form  of 
cost-recovery  from  project  beneficiaries,  as  this  provides  at  least  some 
surrogate  for  the  "willingness  to  pay"  criterion  which  ensures  the  effici- 
N 
ency  of  market  provision  of  private  goods.  So  there  is  again  nothing  new 
about  criterion  (c). 
More  worrying  is  criterion  (b),  particularly  if  it  is  implied  that  the 
collective  action  required  for  the  provision  and  maintenance  of  public  goods 
should  be  through  some  form  of  popular  participation.  As  the  discussion  in 
the  previous  sections  has  highlighted  there  is  no  presumption  that  such 
participation  will  necessarily  enhance  efficiency  or  even  help  the  poorest. 
Nor,  when  the  local  knowledge  which  is  required  for  the  proper  design  of 
public  goods  projects  concerns  subjective  individual  preferences,  is  there 
any  participatory  mechanism  which  will  ensure  that  these  can  be  objectively 
ascertained,  and  more  seriously,  as  social  choice  theory  has  emphasized,  be 
aggregated  into  any  meaningful  social  welfare  function. 
Thus  there  seems  little  that  participation  can  add,  beyond  what  has 
been  standard  Bank  good  practice  in  designing  projects,  namely  obtaining  all 
the  relevant  local  information  and  designing  appropriate  incentive 27 
mechanisms  (which  most  often  mimic  those  of  the  market)  for  the  maintenance 
and  use  of  public  goods  projects.  Whether  or  not  particular  NGOs can  help 
in  this  process  must  be  a  contingent  matter. 
Perhaps  more  help  in  providing  some general  guidelines  for  Bank 
relations  with  NGOs may be  provided  by  some  typology  of  NGOs?  A  useful  one 
is  provided  by  Clark,  He  divides  them  into  six  types: 
(1)  Relief  and  welfare  agencies  --  e.g.,  Catholic  Relief,  various 
missionary  societies 
(2)  Technical  innovation  organizations,  e.g.,  the  Intermediate  Technology 
Group 
(3)  Public  sector  contractors  --  e.g.,  NGOs funded  by  Northern  governments 
to  work  on  Southern  government  and  official  aid  agency  projects,  like 
. 
CARE 
(4)  Popular  development  agencies.  "Northern  NGOs and  their  Southern 
intermediary  counterparts  which  concentrate  on  self-help,  social 
development,  and  grass  roots  democracy,"  e.g.,  local  OXFAMS, CEDI  and 
FASE in  Brazil 
(5)  Grassroots  development  organizations.  "Locally  based  southern  NGOs 
whose  members  are  the  poor  and  oppressed  themselves,  and  which  attempt 
to  shape  a  popular  development  process" 
(6)  Advocacy  groups  and  networks,  "which  have  no  field  projects  but  which 
exist  primarily  for  education  and  lobbying",  e.g.,  environmental 
pressure  groups  in  the  North  and  South. 
One useful  purpose  served  by  this  typology  is  that  given  the  discussion 
in  previous  sections,  whilst  the  type  of  associations  under  5  and  6  may  form 
a  very  important  part  of  creating  a  civil  society  and  maintaining  essential 
liberties,  their  endorsement  by  the  Bank  would  clearly  be  inappropriate.  On 28 
the  other  hand  the  associations  under  (2)  and  (3),  are  service  associations 
(to  coin  a  label),  and  there  use  on  particular  projects  must  depend  upon  the 
merits  of  the  particular  case.  For  here  there  is  a  paucity  of  evidence  on 
the  general  effectiveness  of  such  NGOs.  As  Clark  --  an  OXFAM  employee  -- 
notes:  "there  is  surprisingly  little  objective  reporting  of  NGO  projects. 
Northern  NGOs  own  writings  generally  concentrate  on  the  success  stories  and, 
being  aimed  largely  at  their  supporting  publics,  serve  a  propaganda  purpose. 
The  NGOs  tend  to  commission  few  objective  evaluations,  . . .  and  so  may  not 
even  know  much  about  their  successes  or  failures"  (p.  52).  One  of  the  few 
evaluations  available  is  by  Tendler  of  75  USAID  NGO  projects.  This,  though 
not  as  rigorous  as  the  standard  project  evaluation  methodology  (which  is 
hopefully  still  being  followed  by  the  Bank)  does  dispel  some  of  the  common 
e 
myths  about  these  "service"  NGOs.  Thus  for  instance  she  found  that  NGOs  do 
not  benefit  the  poorest  of  the  poor.  The  beneficiaries  were  most  often  in 
the  middle  and  upper  range  of  the  income  distribution,  as  many  NGOs  have 
moved  away  from  their  initial  strictly  relief  and  welfare  projects  (with 
careful  targeting  of  beneficiaries)  "towards  conventional  development 
projects".  Also  what  was  described  as  participation  by  the  poor  in  the 
projects  was  also  a  myth.  Distinguishing  between  "participation"  and 
"decentralization"  she  found  that,  there  was  greater  decentralization  in 
these  projects  but  the  decisionmaking  was  dominated  by  NGO  staff  and  the 
local  elite.  Lest  it  be  thought  this  was  undesirable  she  also  found  that 
projects  which  reached  the  poorest  were  usually  designed  by  do-gooding 
outsiders!  The  study  thus  confirms  many  of  the  theoretical  points  we  have 
made  in  earlier  sections. 
If  as  we  have  argued  there  may  still  be  a  case  based  on  contingent 
factors  on  associating  particular  "service"  NGOs  with  Bank  projects,  one 29 
essential  piece  of  missing  information  that  is  required  is  on  the  past  track 
record  of  the  NGO in  delivering  the  requisite  services.  For  this  purpose 
just  as  the  Bank  evaluates  its  own past  projects,  it  might  be  desirable  to 
get  independent  audits  done  of  the  past  performance  of  NGOs seeking  to  be 
associated  with  Bank  projects.  As  according  to  the  OECD  over  30  percent  of 
NGOS  annual  funds  come  from  official  sources,  it  would  not  compromise  their 
independence  if  official  and  multilateral  institutions  were  to  demand such 
an  audit. 
This  leaves  the  associations  under  (1)  and  (4).  These  are  largely 
religious  and/or  relief  associations.  Subject  of  course  to  the  proviso 
about  an  audit  of  past  performance,  there  is  some reason  to  believe  that  on 
some  type  of  poverty  alleviation  projects  they  may have  a  comparative 
N 
advantage.  As  historically  the  churches  have  been  the  main  organizations 
for  alleviating  destitution  and  what  can  be  called  conjunctural  poverty  (due 
in  agrarian  economies  to  vagaries  of  nature),  11  they  are  likely  to  have 
organizations  both  for  identifying  the  poorest  as  well  as  in  monitoring  any 
benefits  they  receive.  This  is  of  importance  in  overcoming  the  adverse 
incentive  effects  that  have  bedeviled  many poverty  alleviation  schemes. 
They  may  therefore,  provide  a  more  effective  channel  for  disbursing  foreign 
aid  aimed  at  dealing  with  destitution  and  conjunctural  poverty.  But 
churches  are  par  excellence  enterprise  associations,  which  have  in  the  past 
and  in  some cases  still  seek  to  take  over  the  state.  Thus,  in  countries 
where  the  church  is  at  odds  with  the  state  there  is  a  danger  that  if  foreign 
aid  donors  channel  their  aid  to  help  the  destitute  through  such  churches, 
they  will  be  looked  upon  as  partisans  in  a  local  political  struggle.  Once 
again,  therefore,  the  Bank  could  find  itself  in  treacherous  waters. 30 
Besides  the  church,  self  help  organizations  like  rotating  credit 
associations  (of  which  Bangladesh's  Grammen  Bank  is  a  notable  example),  and 
the  friendly  societies  which  grew  up  in  18th  and  19th  century  Britain  to 
deal  with  destitution  and  conjunctural  poverty,  have  been  of  importance. 
12 
As  these  are  part  of  the  civil  associations  rightly  lauded  by  De  Tocque- 
ville,  which  help  in  maintaining  liberty,  and  furthermore  promote  the 
classical  liberal  vigorous  virtue  of  self-reliance,  they  are  to  be 
commended.  But  whether  public  action  and  support  is  required  for  them  to 
flourish  is  dubious.  As  the  experience  in  the  West  has  shown,  the  estab- 
lishment  of  welfare  states  which  sought  to  substitute  public  for  private 
benevolence,  has  led  to  the  nationalization  of  these  associations. 
13 
These  intermediate  institutions  of  civil  society  were  forced  to  surrender 
. 
their  functions  and  authority  to  professional  elites  and  the  bureaucracies 
of  centralizing  states.  For  their  current  Third  World  counterparts  too,  the 
public  embrace  of  either  foreign  aid  institutions  or  their  own  governments 
could  (for  reasons  of  political  economy)  be  the  kiss  of  death! 
Hence  our  rather  gloomy  conclusion  that  apart  from  a  case-by-case 
appraisal  of  the  desirability  of  associating  the  service  associations 
identified  above,  World  Bank  involvement  with  other  NGOs  is  neither  likely 
to  promote  efficiency  or  liberty  (nor  their  associated  instruments  -- 
markets  and  democracy). 31 
ENDNOTES 
* 
This  paper  has  greatly  benefitted  from  the  comments  of  members  of  a 
seminar  at  the  World  Bank  on  an  earlier  draft. 
1 See  La1  (1983)  and  Little  for  a  discussion  of  development  fads  of  the 
1950s  through  the  1970s.  See  Bebbington  and  Farrington,  Drabek,  and 
Stevulak  and  Thompson  for  references  to  the  literature  and  discussions  on 
the  role  of  NGOs  in  development.  Amongst  the  World  Bank  material  on  the 
subject  in  addition  to  the  last  reference  above,  also  see  Salmen  and  Eaves 
and  Ribe  et  al.,  Barry  remains  an  excellent  critique  of  the  political 
sociology  literature  on  participation  and  democracy,  and  which  also  takes  a 
fairly  cool  look  at  the  early  political  economy  literature  on  the  subject.  0 
Ostrom  et  al.,  is  also  a  useful  collection  relevant  to  the  subject  of  this 
paper.  Finally,  an  excellent  paper  by  Gerson  examines  popular  participation 
in  economic  theory  and  practice.  Besides  providing  a  useful  summary  and 
critique  of  the  quantitative  studies  of  the  effects  of  participation  on  pro- 
ject  effectiveness  (e.g.,  by  Esman  and  Uphofff  and  Finsterbusch  and  Wicklin) 
he  also  surveys  the  available  World  Bank  evidence.  A  number  of  points  he 
makes  may  be  noted  as  they  complement  the  argument  of  this  paper.  First,  as 
general  equilibrium  theory  has  shown,  for  non-public  goods  the  market 
provides  the  most  comprehensive  and  efficient  form  of  popular  participation. 
Moreover  it  is  the  "willingness  to  pay"  criterion  embedded  in  the  market 
which  economists  try  to  evoke  and  implement  when  considering  the  provision 
of  public  goods.  Second,  the  belief  that  participation  provides  some  easy 
way  to  elicit  the  preferences.of  beneficiaries  of  public  goods  is  belied  by 
Arrow's  famous  Impossibility  theorem  about  aggregating  individual  prefer- 32 
ences  into  a  social  choice  function  without  violating  some  unexceptional 
conditions  such  as  non-dictatorship!  Third,  that  some  form  of  cost-recov- 
ery,  through  the  contribution  of  time  or  money  by  beneficiaries  is  an 
effective  form  of  participation,  even  in  the  provision  of  public  goods. 
2 An  excellent  account  of  this  is  in  Muller. 
3 This  is  Shirley  Letwin's  term  to  describe  the  "moral"  content  of 
Thatcherism. 
4 This  corresponds  to  what  Oakeshott  (1993)  calls  the  productivist  and 
distributionist  versions  of  the  modern  embodiments  of  the  enterprise 
association,  whose  religious  version  was  epitomized  by  Calvinist  Geneva,  and 
in  our  own  times  is  provided  by  Khomeni's  Iran.  Each  of  these  collective  . 
forms  conjures  up  some  notion  of  perfection,  believed  to  be  "the  common 
good".  Of  these  three  versions  Oakeshott  (p.  92)  notes: 
first  a  "religious"  version  ,  where  "perfection"  is  understood  as 
"righteousness"  or  "moral  virtue";  secondly  a  "productivist" 
version,  where  "perfection"  is  understood  as  a  condition  of 
"prosperity"  or  "abundance"  or  "wealth";  and  thirdly  a  "distribu- 
tionist"  version,  where  "perfection"  is  understood  as  "security" 
or  "welfare".  These  three  versions  of  the  politics  of 
collectivism  succeed  one  another  in  the  history  of  modern  Europe 
. . .  And  in  our  own  time  the  politics  of  collectivism  may  be  seen 
to  be  composed  of  a  mixture  in  which  each  of  these  versions  has 
its  place. 
5 This  is  based  on  La1  and  Myint.  On  the  French  Revolution  see 
Aftalion. 
6 Sen  characterizes  the  Chinese  cultural  revolution  in  these  terms  and 
with  some  implicit  approbation! 
7 This  term  and  the  following  argument  is  due  to  Ken  Minogue. 33 
8 See  Gourevitch  for  a  further  elaboration  of  the  tenuous  link  between 
forms  of  government  and  their  promotion  of  markets. 
9 
Nor  is  there  any  connection  between  military  regimes,  and  mutatis 
mutandis,  authoritarian  regimes  and  development.  For  a  detailed  study  of 
the  links  between  the  military  and  development  see  Alexander  Berg  and  Elliot 
Berg. 
10 See  La1  for  a  substantiation  of  this  point,  as  well  as  a  general 
discussion  based  on  the  findings  of  the  Lal-Myint  study  on  poverty  and 
development. 
11 In  La1  (1993)  following  Illiffe  I  distinguish  between  three  types  of 
poverty.  The  first  is  the  mass  structural  novertv  which  has  been  the  fate  - 
of  much  of  mankind  until  the  era  of  modern  economic  growth.  This  as  the 
experience  of  current  developed  and  a  growing  number  of  developing  countries 
shows  can  be  cured  by  efficient  growth.  World  Bank  policy  advice  and  pro- 
ject  lending  which  helps  in  this  process  necessarily  alleviates  this 
historic  hard  core  of  poverty.  This  still  leaves  the  problems  of  destitu- 
tion  and  coniunctural  novertv  which  have  traditionally  composed  the  problem 
of  poverty  that  public  policy  has  sought  to  alleviate.  In  the  agrarian 
economies  of  the  past,  labor  was  scarce  relative  to  land,  and  hence 
destitution  was  due  to  a  lack  of  labor  power  to  work  land  (either  their  own- 
because  of  disabilities  --  or  from  family  members  --  because  they  had  none). 
This  is  still  true  of  parts  of  Africa.  With  population  expansion  and 
growing  land  scarcity  destitutes  emerged  who  lacked  land,  work  or  adequate 
wages  to  support  their  dependents.  Finally,  throughout  history  there  has 
been  conjunctural  poverty  where  people  have  fallen  over  the  brink  (albeit 34 
temporarily)  because  of  climatic  crises  or  political  turmoil.  In  industrial 
economies,  the  trade  cycle  has  added  another  form  of  conjunctural  poverty 
associated  with  cyclical  unemployment. 
12 See  Green. 
13 Green  provides  a  detailed  account  of  the  U.K.  experience. 35 
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